



FALL 2018 LOCAL ECONOMIC REPORT

FORECAST REPORT

2018



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CONTENTS

- 4. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- 6-10. SONOMA COUNTY ECONOMY
- 11-12. MOODY'S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- 13. MOODY'S FORECAST RISKS




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

October 2018

The Sonoma County Economic Development Board is pleased to present the Fall 2018 Local Economic Report. Our research partner, Moody's Analytics, provided the data for this report. For additional information, questions, comments, or suggestions, please contact us at (707) 565-7170 or visit www.sonomaedb.org.

HIGHLIGHTS



Despite an increasingly tight **labor market**, job growth in Sonoma County matches the state average and surpasses that of similarly-sized economies in Santa Barbara, Sacramento, Santa Cruz, and Monterey. The most growth is in low-wage jobs; nevertheless, income growth is higher than most other California counties. Keeping pace with job growth is household permit issuance, which has doubled since 2017 and continues to grow. The first six months of 2018 saw more permits issued in Sonoma County than at any other time since 1990.

Housing remains Sonoma County's most pressing issue: while permit issuance is up, household formation is still growing four times faster than single-family home construction. Vacancy rates are low both in homes for sale and for renters as compared with the United States; houses are about half as affordable in Sonoma County as they are in the United States. This has demographic implications, as well: higher home prices are curtailing migration, limiting the supply of working-age people to take up the jobs of the County's many retirees. For the first time, net migration in Sonoma County is negative.

Sonoma County's **business outlook** is also strong across sectors: productivity is up in manufacturing, leisure, and healthcare as these sectors hire more. Consumer demand for craft beverages is driving growth, pushing sales up and encouraging greater tourism from the region and throughout California. As wages continue to increase here and elsewhere, tourism can be expected to maintain a steady growth rate into the future. Cost of doing business remains relatively low, although high energy prices compared to the United States are driving those up.




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ECONOMIC HEALTH CHECK

3-MO MA						
	Jan 18	Feb 18	Mar 18	Apr 18	May 18	Jun 18
Employment, change, ths	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3
Unemployment rate, %	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8
Labor force participation rate, %	64.2	64.2	64.1	63.9	63.7	63.5
Employment-to-population ratio, %	62.2	62.3	62.2	62.0	61.8	61.7
Average weekly hours, #	32.5	32.5	32.1	32.2	32.1	32.3
Industrial production, 2012=100	108.2	108.7	108.7	109.7	110.2	110.8
Residential permits, single-family, #	1,169	1,260	1,779	2,191	2,963	3,212
Residential permits, multifamily, #	283	343	427	490	406	217
Better than prior 3-mo MA	Unchanged from prior 3-mo MA			Worse than prior 3-mo MA		

Sources: BLS, Census Bureau, Moody's Analytics




Sources: BIS, Moody's Analytics



	% Change vs Q1, 3 mos Fwd		
	Jun 17	Dec 17	Jun 18
Total	2.3	2.0	1.8
Mining	-0.4	0.1	-0.3
Construction	7.5	5.6	6.0
Manufacturing	1.4	3.4	6.2
Trade	0.8	0.6	1.3
Trans/Utilities	-4.7	-0.6	2.5
Information	0.1	0.1	-0.1
Financial Activities	0.1	1.7	0.7
Prof & Business Svcs.	4.3	5.1	-2.5
Edu & Health Svcs.	2.8	4.9	5.5
Leisure & Hospitality	1.9	-0.6	0.2
Other Services	1.0	0.6	-1.0
Government	2.8	-1.0	-1.2

Sources: BLS, Moody's Analytics



RELATIVE EMPLOYMENT PERFORMANCE



Sources: BLS, Moody's Analytics




HOUSE PRICE




Sources: FHFA, Moody's Analytics

VACANCY RATES



Sources: Census Bureau, ACS, Moody's Analytics, 2011





Sources: FHFA, Moody's Analytics


HOUSING AFFORDABILITY



Sources: NAR, Moody's Analytics







Sources: ACS, Moody's Analytics

Significant Differences, Eerie Similarities

BY MARK ZANDI

The business cycle has entered its boom phase, a period that typically comes closer to a cycle's end, just prior to a recession. It is characterized by robust economic growth, tightening labor and product markets, intensifying wage and price pressures, monetary tightening, and higher interest rates.

Growth remains about as strong as it has been since the cycle began more than nine years ago, juiced up by massive deficit-financed tax cuts for individuals and businesses and increases in government spending. Real GDP is on track to expand 3% this year, substantially more than the economy's estimated 2% potential growth rate. Employment should increase by nearly 2.5 million jobs.

Unemployment appears set to ultimately fall into the low threes, well below our 4.5% estimate of the full-employment unemployment rate.

Capacity utilization rates are increasing, and the percentage of the housing stock that is vacant is as low as it has been since the early 1980s despite overbuilding in the high end of the apartment market (see Chart 1). Hotel occupancy rates are as high as they have been since prior to the recession, and airline load factors are hovering near record highs.

Pressures building

Contrary to conventional wisdom, wage growth is picking up on cue. As measured by

the employment cost index, the most accurate of the wage statistics, wages for private sector workers are up 3% from a year ago. This is the strongest wage growth since the recession hit, as it should be in an economy operating beyond full employment.

As unemployment heads lower, wage growth will accelerate further, outstripping productivity gains, squeezing businesses' profit margins, and pressuring businesses to raise prices more quickly. Indeed, core consumer price inflation is now as strong as it has been in almost a decade.

The Federal Reserve recognizes it needs to steadily normalize short-term rates. This means raising the federal funds rate from its current level near 2% to its equilibrium rate, which we estimate to be near 3.5%.

Financial conditions are signaling that stock, bond and real estate markets are almost certainly overvalued. Equity price-earnings multiples are high, credit spreads for below-investment-grade corporate and emerging market bonds are thin, and commercial real estate capitalization rates are low. Combined with an easing in underwriting standards by banks and other creditors, the Fed will need to raise rates even more to cool off the booming economy.

Excessive risk-taking

Another feature of the boom phase of a business cycle is excessive risk-taking some-

where in the financial system. This fuels the boom and is eventually at the center of the subsequent bust. Subprime mortgage loans were the obvious culprit a decade ago.

Risk-taking is clearly on the rise, though it is unclear precisely what might do this cycle in. There has been hand-wringing that households may be overborrowing again, but this concern seems overblown. Household credit growth is consistent with income gains, and debt loads that had fallen sharply after the last recession show no indication of rising. Debt service burdens remain low. And personal savings rates look ample after recent data revisions (see Chart 2).

Student loans are a problem, but not for the financial system, since the bulk of these loans are backed by the federal government. Student loans are thus a taxpayer problem, which could manifest itself in the next downturn by adding to the nation's fiscal problems. Even so, worries that the nation's ballooning budget deficits and debt load could do this cycle in are also overdone. They are a corrosive on growth as they push up long-term interest rates, but we are still a long way from U.S. Treasury bonds losing their safe-haven status to global investors.

Leveraged lending

The most serious developing threat to the current cycle is lending to highly lever-


A Housing Shortage

Vacancy rate, homes for sale and rent, 4-qtr MA, %



Sources: Census Bureau, Moody's Analytics

Household Finances Are Strong



Sources: BEA, Federal Reserve, Moody's Analytics

aged nonfinancial businesses. Across all businesses, borrowing appears manageable. The ratio of debt outstanding to GDP is about as high as it has ever been, yet this is a continuation of a long-running trend and reflects a broadening in the availability of credit to more businesses.

However, while businesses appear to be in good shape in aggregate, a significant number of highly leveraged companies are taking on sizable amounts of debt. This is evident in the rapid growth of so-called leveraged loans—loans extended to companies that already have considerable debt. These loans tend to have floating rates—typically Libor plus a spread—with a below-investment-grade (Baa or less) rating.

Leveraged loan volumes are setting records, and loans outstanding have increased at a double-digit pace over the past five years to near \$1.4 trillion (see Chart 3).

Powering leveraged lending is demand from the collateralized loan obligation market. CLOs are leveraged loans that have been securitized. Global investors cannot seem to get enough of CLOs. This is clear from the thin spreads between CLO yields and comparable risk-free Treasuries. Approximately one-half of leveraged loans currently being originated are packaged into CLOs, with CLO outstandings approaching \$550 billion.

Easing underwriting

To meet the strong demand, lenders are easing their underwriting standards. Ac-

cording to the Federal Reserve's survey of senior loan officers at commercial banks, a net 15% of respondents say they lowered their standards on commercial and industrial loans to large and medium-size companies this quarter compared with the previous quarter. The only other time loan officers eased as aggressively on a consistent basis was at the height of the euphoria leading up the financial crisis in the mid-2000s (see Chart 4).

Covenants on leveraged loans—restrictions on borrowers to ensure they can repay their loans—have also deteriorated, according to Moody's Investors Service. The rating agency's loan covenant quality indicator has fallen to its lowest level in its six-year history. Borrowers are negotiating greater flexibility to manage their balance sheets. They are increasingly able to sell collateral without using the proceeds to pay down their loans. It is becoming more unclear whether the collateral backstopping loans will be available in a bankruptcy.

The easing in underwriting is also evident in the below-investment-grade or junk corporate bond market. It has not kept pace with the surging leveraged loan market, but it is nearly as big, with more than \$1.3 trillion in outstandings. Here as well, bond covenants have eroded substantially in recent years.

Eerie similarities

Considering the leveraged loan and junk corporate bond market together, highly

indebted nonfinancial companies owe some \$2.7 trillion. As interest rates rise, so too will financial pressure on these borrowers. Despite all this, global investors appear sanguine; credit spreads in the CLO and junk corporate bond market are narrow by any historical standard.


Regulators are undoubtedly nervous—they issued guidance to banks to rein in their leveraged lending in 2013—but an increasing amount of the most aggressive lending is being done by private equity, mezzanine debt, and other institutions outside the banking system and regulators' purview.

Now consider that subprime mortgage debt outstanding was close to \$3 trillion at its peak prior to the financial crisis. Insatiable demand by global investors for residential mortgage securities drove the demand for subprime mortgages, inducing lenders to steadily lower their underwriting standards. Subprime loans were adjustable rate, which became a problem in a rising rate environment as borrowers did not have the wherewithal to make their rising mortgage payments. Regulators were slow to respond, in part because they did not have jurisdiction over the more egregious players.

It is much too early to conclude that nonfinancial businesses will end the current cycle in the way subprime mortgage borrowers did the previous one. Even so, while there are significant differences between leveraged lending and subprime mortgage lending, the similarities are eerie.

Nonfinancial Firms Take On Lots of Debt


Leveraged loans, \$ bil



Sources: IMF, Moody's Analytics

Lenders Go Easier on Business Borrowers

Net % of loan officers tightening standards on C&I loans



Forecast Assumptions

BY MARK ZANDI

Monetary policy

The Federal Reserve is expected to steadily normalize interest rates over the remainder of the decade. The Fed hiked the federal funds rate three times in 2017, and twice so far this year, a quarter percentage point each time. We expect it to hike rates two more times in 2018, and four times in 2019, with the funds rate peaking at 3.5%.

Behind this expected normalization in monetary policy is an economy operating well beyond full employment. With deficit-financed tax cuts and government spending increases juicing up growth, the economy threatens to overheat. Core inflation is expected to pick up, from near its 2% target as measured by the growth in the core consumer expenditure deflator, to a high closer to 3% by the end of the decade.

Normalization also means the Fed will allow its balance sheet to diminish. The balance sheet swelled to nearly \$4.5 trillion in Treasury and mortgage securities as a result of four rounds of quantitative easing. In a full-employment economy, the Fed's balance sheet should be closer to \$3 trillion. The Fed has begun to right-size its balance sheet by allowing the securities it owns to mature and prepay. It is expected to take approximately four years to complete the task.

The behavior of bond investors could complicate the job of normalizing monetary policy. The economic outlook is based on a steady but orderly rise in long-term rates, with 10-year Treasury yields rising from just under 3% to nearer 4% by late 2019. This compares with an estimated 4.4% normalized 10-year yield consistent with an economy at full employment. Long-term yields will not fully normalize until global central banks end their QE programs, and the Fed's balance sheet shrinks—not likely until the next decade.

Fiscal policy

The federal government's fiscal situation is eroding as the deficit-financed tax cuts and government spending increases kick in.

Those measures ensure that the deficit this fiscal year will be near \$800 billion, and well over \$1 trillion, equal to 5% of GDP, in fiscal 2019. The nation's debt-to-GDP ratio will be more than 3 percentage points higher by the end of President Trump's first term than if there were no change in fiscal policy, and almost 7 percentage points higher in a decade.

Fiscal policy should add approximately 0.7 percentage point to real GDP growth in 2018 and about the same in 2019, but any long-term economic benefit from the lower marginal corporate tax rates will be washed out by the economic cost of the bigger government debt load and resulting higher interest rates.

U.S. dollar

The real broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar has firmed this year because of the fiscal-stimulus fueled U.S. economy and somewhat weaker growth overseas, particularly in Europe. Volatile European politics, most notably in Italy and Spain, are also behind the softer euro. The dollar has found further support in the escalating trade tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners, which is supporting a flight-to-quality bid for the dollar.

The dollar is expected to hold firm, and even appreciate a bit more over the coming two years as the Fed steadily normalizes U.S. monetary policy. The Trump administration's anti-globalization stance will also support the dollar against currencies of countries with which the U.S. has trade frictions, including the Mexican peso and Canadian dollar.

Despite the ups and downs in the U.S. dollar, on a real broad trade-weighted basis, it is close to its average value since it began to freely float in the early 1970s and is near its estimated long-run fair value. The dollar's resilience will ensure that it remains the global economy's principal reserve currency for the foreseeable future.

Energy prices

Oil prices have firmed to more than \$65 per barrel from a low of nearly \$25

per barrel in early 2016. Prices will remain volatile and may rise in coming months given the anticipated collapse of the Iranian nuclear deal. Also underpinning prices are strong global oil demand, a right-sizing of global oil inventories, and a pullback in energy investment.

Despite all this, oil prices are expected to fall back to their long-run equilibrium level of \$55 to \$60 per barrel by early 2020. Natural gas prices will remain low, particularly compared with oil prices, for the next decade.

Geopolitics

How the escalating trade war will play out is increasingly difficult to gauge. Trump appears set on increasing tariffs on a widening range of imports until U.S. trade partners blink and agree to help reduce the U.S. trade deficit, and in the case of the Chinese, protect intellectual property of U.S. companies and more fully open their markets. However, China and the rest of world are digging in and unlikely to back down. This brinkmanship seems set to escalate until global financial markets crack.

In the most likely scenario, only \$100 billion of U.S. imports and exports will ultimately face higher tariffs. If this is the extent of the tariff increases, then the macroeconomic consequences will be modest. U.S. real GDP will be reduced by just more than 0.1 percentage point at the peak of the impact a year from now, and some 170,000 jobs will be lost over the period.

Moody's Analytics assumes a relatively soft Brexit scenario, in which the U.K. stays in the customs union for goods but not for services, for which it negotiates some type of free-trade deal; the U.K. maintains control over immigration into the country; and the U.K. continues to pay some of the EU's budget. Under this baseline, uncertainty weighs on U.K. growth through much of 2020, and the U.K.'s long-term growth potential is diminished. The global macroeconomic implications are small.



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